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THE GREEK VERB "TO BE" AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING 
by Charles H. Kahn 
University of Pennsylvania 
I am concerned in this paper with the philological basis for Greek ontology, 
that is to say, with the raw material which was provided for philosophical 
analysis by the ordinary use and meaning of the verb einai, "to be". Roughly 
stated, my question is: how were the Greek philosophers guided, or influenced, 
in their formulation of doctrines of Being, by the pre�philosophical use of this 
verb which (together with its nominal derivatives on and ousia) serves to express 
the concept of Being in Greek? 
--
Before beginning the discussion of this question, I would like to say a 
word about the implications of posing it in this form. I take it for granted 
that all thinking is conditioned to some extent by the structure of the language 
�n which we express or formulate our thoughts, and that this was particularly 
true for the Greek philosophers, who knew no language but their ownn However, 
I do not assume (as many modern critics seem to do) that such linguistic condi­
tioning is necessarily a limitation, or a disadvantage. A partial disadvantage 
it may be, since a logical confusion can arise easily in one language �hich 
would be impossible in another. But a philosopher .• even a philosopher ignorant 
of other languages - is always free to make a distinction which the language 
does not make for him, just as he is free to ignore a distinction built into the 
vocabulary or syntax of his speech, when he does not find this linguistic datum 
of philosophic importance� (A familiar example of the Greek philosopher's free­
dom in this respect is the irony which Socrates displays whenever he refers to 
Prodicus' practice of distinguishing between the meaning of near-synonyms.) The 
fact that Greek philosophy has been fruitfully translated into other tongues -· 
notably into a language so different as Arabic - suggests that it is not language­
bound in any very narrow sense. 
On the other hand, it is clear that any given language permits the native 
speaker to formulate certain notions, or to make certain distinctions, more easily 
and more spontaneously than others• To this extent, one language ... and I mean 
one natural language, of course - may be philosophically more adequate than 
another. In this sense, I would suggest that ancient Greek is one of the most 
adequate of all languages, and that the possession of s�ch a language was in fact 
a necessary condition for the success of the Greeks in creating Western logic 
and philosophy - and, I suspect, also for their success in creating theoretical 
science and rigorous mathematics, but this second point might be harder to defend. 
In any case, I do not intend to argue the superior merits of Greek as a 
language for philosophy, nor to maintain any general thesis about the relationship 
between philosophic thought and the structure of a given language4 I mention 
these larger questions only to make clear that I wish to leave them open� All 
I hope to show is that some features of the use and meaning of einai, - features 
which are less conspicuous or entirely lacking for the verb "to be" in most modern 
languages - may cast light on the ontological doctrines of the Greeks by bringing 
out the full significance, and the unstated presuppositions, of the concepts 
expressed by esti, einai, on and ousiao In other words, I propose to use the 
philological material in a-Purely instrumental way, not as a stick with which 
to beat the ancient thinkers for ignoring distinctions which we take for granted, 
but as a tool for the more adequate understanding of the Greek doctrines from 
their own point of view, including those ideas which the Greeks could take for 
granted but which we are inclined to ignore. 
* * * 
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It is scarcely necessary to emphasize how important a role the concept 
of Being has played in the philosophical tradition which stretches from antiquity 
through the middle ages down into modern thought. Except perhaps for the concept­
of Nature, it would be hard to mention a philosophic idea which has enjoyed a 
··  
comparable influence. The concept of Being is still very much alive today, at 
least in German philosophy: witness Heidegger's intensive study of what he calls 
the Se ins fr age, and Gottfried Martin 1 s recent definition of "Allgemeine Meta­
physik'1 by reference to the classical question: Was ist das Sein? Yet we cannot 
blink the fact that, in English and American philosophy a"t°anyrate, the concept 
of Being is likely to be regarded with great suspicion, as a pseudo-concept or 
a mere confusion of several distinct ideas. The most obvious distinction which 
seems to us to be ignored in the notion of Being is that between existence and 
predication. The logician will go further, and point out that the word 1iis" 
means one thing when it represents the existential quantifier, something else 
when it represents class-inclusion or class-membership, something else when it 
represents identity, and so forth. 
I shall here leave aside the distinctions based upon the logic of classes 
and the strict notion of identity (as governed by Leibniz' law), because I do 
not find these distinctions reflected or respected in the actual usage of the 
verb "to be" in Greek, or in English either for that matter .1 But the distinction 
between the "is" of existence and the "is" of predication is now so well esta­
blished in our own thought, and even in the usage of our language, that it cannot 
be ignored in any discussion of Being. I begin, therefore, with the classic 
statement of this distinction by John Stuart Mill, who claimed that 
many volumes might be filled with the frivolous speculations 
concerning the nature of being � • • which have arisen from 
overlooking this double meaning of the word to be; from 
supposing that when it signifies to exist, and when it signi­
fies to be some specified thing, as to be a man, • • • to be 
seen or spoken of, • • •  even to be a nonentity, it must still, 
at bottom, answer to the same idea • • • •  The fog which rose 
from this narrow spot diffused itself at an early period over 
the whole surface of metaphysics. (Logic I, iv. i) 
Mill's distinction has not only been built into the symbolism of modern 
logic; it has also been taken over, with remarkable unanimity, into the standard 
descriptive grammars of ancient Greek. Although the distinction was almost a 
new one for Mill, it has now become traditional.2 I shall not question the use 
of this distinction in logic, but I have very grave doubts about its appropriate­
ness in Greek grammar. For one thing, there is the practical difficulty of 
applying Mill's dichotomy. I can find no evidence for such a distinction in the 
usage of the classical authors, who pass blithely back and forth between uses 
which we might identify as existential and copulative. I have seen exegetes 
furrowing their brow over the question whether Plato in a given passage of the 
Sophist means us to take einai in the existential or the copulative sense, 
whereas in fact he shows no sign of wishing to confront us with any such choice. 
But there is a graver theoretical disadvantage in the traditional dichotomy 
between the existential and the predicative uses of "to be". It confounds a 
genuine syntactic distinction - between the absolute and predicative construc­
tions of the verb - with a further semantic contrast between the meaning !Ito 
exist" and some other meaning or absence of meaning. This fusion of a syntactic 
and a semantic criterion into a single antithesis could be justified only if 
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there were a direct correlation between the two, i.e. only if (1) the absolute 
use of the verb is always existential in meaning, and (2) the verb "to be" in 
the predicative construction is always devoid of meaning, serving as a merely 
formal or grammatical device for linking the predicate with the subject. But 
these assumptions seem to me dubious for English, and false for Greek. In 
English the existential idea is expressed by the special locution "there is" 
and not by the verb "to be" alone: there seems to be no idiomatic use of the 
absolute construction of "to be11 at all., A sentence like 11I think therefore 
I am11 is possible only in philosophy.'lb the disappearance of the absolute construc­
tion corresponds the universal prevalence of the copulative use of "to be", 
which is required with all predicates other than finite verbs. In historical 
terms, one can say that the rule that every sentence must have a finite verb 
has resulted in such a great expansion of the predicative use of 11to be" that 
the original, semantically fuller use of the verb has been obscured or lost, 
and really survives only in the isolated locution "there is". But this decay 
of the absolute usage in most modern languages may give us a false idea of the 
original range and force of the verb. In Greek, by contrast, where the absolute 
construction of "to be" is in full vigor, it does not necessarily mean "to exist" 
(as we shall see). On the other hand, since non••verbal predicates in Greek do 
not automatically require a copulative esti, the tendency towards a purely formal 
use of the verb, devoid of semantic content, is not as far advanced. Because 
the predicative verb is never obligatory, it may be used with a certain variety 
of semantic nuances� 
My position, then, is that Mill's dichotomy is applicable to Greek only 
as a syntactic distinction between the absolute and the predicative construction, 
and that even from the point of view of syntax the distinction is not as easy 
to define as one might suppose. But semantically the distinction is worse 
than useless, for it leads us to take the idea of existence for granted as the 
basic meaning of the Greek verb. Now if by a word for existence one means 
simply an expression which we would normally render into English by "there is", 
then it is clear that the Greek verb esti often has this sense. But if existence 
is accepted as it usually is, as a fundamental philosophic concept, distinguished 
on the one hand from essence or from predicative attributes or from a proposi­
tional function such as F(x), and conceived on the other hand as the positive 
feature whose negative antithesis is nothingness or nonentity or the null set, 
then I would be inclined to deny that this modern notion of existence can be 
taken for granted as a basis for understanding the meaning of the Greek verb. 
On the contrary, I suggest that a more careful analysis of the Greek notion of 
Being might provoke us into some second thoughts about the clarity and self­
evidence of our familiar concept of existence. 
Let me cite some evidence for what may seem the rather scandalous claim 
that the Greeks did not have our notion of existence. In the chapter of his 
philosophical lexicon which is devoted to the topic "being" or "what is", 
to on (Met. Delta 7), Aristotle distinguishes four basic senses of "to be" 
in Greek: 
1. being per accidens, or random predication (i.e. "X is Y", 
without regard to the logical status of subject and predicate). 
2. being per se, or predication in good logical form according to 
the scheme of the categories (e.g�, when a quality is predicated 
of a substance). Here einai is said to have as many senses 
as there are categories, and Aristotle points out that a con-
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struction with 11to be" may be substituted for any finite verb, 
e.g., 1;he is walking'' for nhe walks". 
3. cinai and esti may mean "is true11, and the negative means "is 
false". An example is "Socrates is musical", if one says this 
(with emphasis) because it is true: 
4. Finally,. nbeing11 may mean either being in potency or being in 
act. "For we say that something is seeing both when it is 
potentially seeing (capable of sight) and when it is actually 
seeing.i: 
Aristotle's procedure here is not purely lexical: he is analyzing ordinary 
usage in the light of his philosophical conceptions. But my point is that 
neither Aristotle's own conceptual scheme nor the normal usage of the verb obliges 
him to make any place for a sense of einai which we would recognize as distinc­
tively existential. Furth�rmore, in every one of Aristotle's examples the verb 
is construed as predicative, although the general topic for the chapter is given 
in the absolute form, "what is".3 The syntactic distinction between predicative 
and absolute construction is treated here as of no consequence whatever. 
As a second illustration of the gap between Greek nbeing" and our notion 
of existence, I take the famous openj_ng sentence from ::;�otagoras' work On Truth: 
"Man is the measure of all things, of what is, that it is , of ·what is not, 
that it is not11 (ton onton hos esti, ton me onton hos ouk esti). This is as 
significant and emphatic a use of the Verb as G::eek canoffer. Since the con� 
struction is absolute, we might be inclined to interpret the verb as existential 
here. But there are two difficulties in the way of such an interpretation. In 
the first place, Frotagoras clearly intends to make men the measure of all things, 
i.e., of all matters of fact or alleged fact, not merely of questions of existence. 
His statement is more appropriate as the opening sentence of a oork on truth if 
we give the verb a very genera 1 sense: nman is the measure of what is the case, 
that it is the case, and of what is not so, that it is not soo11 The second 
objection to understanding the verb as existential here is that Plato, when he 
quotes this dictum in the Theaetetus, immediately goes on to explain it by means 
of the predicative construction: "as each thing seems to me, such is it for me; 
as it seems to you, such is it for you" (hoia � phainetai, �uta �n 
emoU. And he illustrates by the example of a wind which is cold for one man, 
but not for another. Unless Plato is radically misrepresenting Protagoras (which 
is at least unlikely), I'rotagoras himself must have intended his dictum to apply 
to facts stated in the predicative, and not merely in the existential form. 
Even if Plato were misinterpreting Pi:·otagoras, his interpretation would show 
that for a Greek philosopher, the meaning of a strong use of einai in the absolute 
construction is not necessarily existential. Plato's exegesis becomes entirely 
natural and intelligible if we understand the absolute use of einai as I have 
Suggested; as an affirmation Of fact in general, aS nwhat is SO" or :i,.Uhe!t :i.G 
the case11• The existential use7 e.g. for an affirmatior. such as 11there are 
atoms and the void11, wo uld then be included as a special case of the general factual 
assertion intended by Protagoras' statement hos esti. If man is the measure of 
all things, "that they are so or not sorr, then he is the measure of the existence 
or nonexistence of atoms just as he is the measure of the being-cold or not­
being-cold of the wind. 
These remarks are intended to render plausible my claim that, for the philo­
sophical usage of the verb, the most fundam ental value of einai when used alone 
(without predicates) is not 11to existn but 11to oe sor• 0to be the case" or 
If ' . ' to be true11• It is worth noting that this meaning o[ the verb, which appears 
among the four uses listed in the chapter of Met. Delta summarized above (where 
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been completed by introducing aorist or perfect :forms form a different verbal 
root. Thus Latin incorporated fui, futurum into the system of -�' just as 
English acquired pe, ,Y�n ;:;:-om the same root, and �' � from anothe;: som_·ce 
(cf. German war, gewcscn). f\.s a result, the verb 11to be11 in these lanzuages 
has lost (or at any rate gravely weakened) the ;:wpectual value which charac­
terized the I. -E. stem �·:es-, whereas the Greek verb einai, has faithfully 
preserved, or even strengthened, its durative l:haracter. 
What is the philosophic significance of this rnorpho-semantic fact? I 
think it may help us to understand (1) the Greek notion of eternity as a stable 
present, an untroubled state oE duration, (Z) the c.lassical antithesis of 
Being and Becoming, and (3) the incommensu:cabiHty already noted between the 
Greek concept of being and the modern-medieval notion of existence. 
Let me illustrate these points briefly. (1) The gods in Homer and Hesiod 
are theoi aien eontes, nthe (30ds who arc forever." In this and in a whole set 
of related uses, �inai has practically the sense nto be 1llive, to survive11• 
The gods � forever because they are deathless beings: their vital duration 
continues without end. Now, strictly speaking, tho gods are not eternal. As 
tl'c Theogony informs us in some detail, they have all been ].Jorn: their vital 
duration had a temporal beginning. It is the philosophers who introduce an 
absolute arche or Beeinning uhich ir-: itself unbq;un, a permanent and ungenerate<l 
source of generation. The initiator here is probably Anaximander, but we can 
see the result more clearly in the poem of Parmenideo. His being is :forever 
in the strong sense: it is ungenerated (agen�ton) as well as unperishing 
(anolethron). Limited neither by birth nor by death, the duration of }'lhat is 
replaces and transcends tl:.e unendinz, survival -.;Jhich characterized the Olympian 
gods. 
(2) Parmenides was also the first to e::::ploit the durative connotations 
o·: ' einai by a systematic cont"i.·ast with gignesthat, the verb which normally pro­
vides an aorist for ei_pai, and uhich exprosseo the developmental idea oc·: bL·th, 
of acnieving a new state, of emerging as novelty or as event. In Parmcnides 
as in Plato, the durative-present aspect of e��na1: thus provides the linguistic 
underpinning for the antithesis in which Being is opposed to Becoming ns stabi­
lity to flux. 9 
(3) This intrinsically stable and lasting character of Being in Greek -­
-which makes it so appropriate as tho object of knouing nnd the correlati.ve of 
truth -- distinguishes it in a radical way from our modern notion of existence, 
insofar as the latter has preserved any of the original semantic flavor of 
Latin cxsistere. For the aspectual features of the Latin verb are entirely 
discrepant with those of e:�na1:, and actually closer to _gignesthai_, Etymologi­
cally exsistere suggests a standing-out or a stepping forth, a coming-into­
being, an eme:cgence out of a dark background into the light of day. The lin­
guistic structure of the verb reinforces this idea, since the preverb _e�::­
implies the completion of a process while the aspect of the reduplicated pre­
sent is punctual rather than durative (in contrast to staE_£).10 Instead oS: 
an antithesis to Becoming, _existentia provides as it ue;_·e the perfect of 
gignesthai: the state achieved as a result of the p;.·ocess of coming-to-be. 
And in fact the sense of existence was originally acquired by the verb in the 
perfect: the existent was conceived literally as nwhat has emerged", id guod 
exstitit.11 Now what has emerged into the light of day is in a sense the 
contingent, what might not have emerged and what might easily disappear once 
more. Under the influence oE the Biblical notion o:E Creation,and the radical 
distinction betueen essence and existence which folloc1s from it in the medieval 
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war ld is an X". 
The importance of the locative associations of einai for an understanding 
of the ordinary existential use of the verb may be a matter on which philolo­
gists will disagree. But I think there can be no disagreement on the close 
connection between the ideas of existence and location in Greek philosophical 
thought. We have from Presocratic times the well-estlblished axiom that 
whatever is, is somewhere· what is nowhere is nothing. !+ As 1: la to puts it 
-,----- -- --
' -- -
- ----
(stating not his own view, but th.2t of Greek common sense), "we say that what 
is neither on earth nor anywhere in heaven is nothing at all" (�. 52B). If 
existence and location are not identical in Greek thought, they are at least 
logically equivalent, for they imply one another. That is, they do for the, 
average man, and for the philosophers before Plato. Hence the � of Anaxa­
goras, which is as spiritual or"mental11 a power as he could conceive, is nonethe­
less thought of as located in place, namely in the same place 'iwhere everything 
else isn (fr. 14). The principle of Love for Empedocles is an invisible force 
of attraction and a general law of combination by rational proportion, but 
it is also to be found 11swirling amongn the other elements, 11equal to them in 
length and breadth11 (fr. 17, 20-25). Even the Being of Parmenides, the most 
metaphysical concept in Presocratic thought, is compared to a sphere, and con­
ceived as a solid mass extending equally in a ll directions. It is not merely 
that Greek thought was instinctively concrete: the very notion of being had 
local connotations. And so Plato, when for the first time he clearly intro­
duced non-spatial e9tities into a philosophical theory, was careful to situate 
his new Forms in a hew kind of place. What we ar e in the habit of calling the 
11intelligible world" is presented by Plato quite literally as an intelligible 
region or place, the noetos topos, conceived by analogy with the region known 
to sense-experience, but sharply contrasted with it, in order to serve as the 
setting for Plato's radically new view of Being. 
How did the new view of Being arise? There could be many answers to this 
question. I would like to end by suggesting one which may at the same time 
serve as a summary of the main points I have tried to make. 
We began by admHting with Aristotle and Mill that "to be11 is not univocal, 
and that any doctrine of Being is obliged to reckon '07ith a plurality of senses. 
Furthermore, the range of meaning of einai in Greek is likely to be wider and 
richer than that of the corresponding verb in any other language -- and certainly 
richer than the verb "to be" in most modern languages. For that very reason, 
the traditional dichotomy between the existential and the predicative use of the 
verb would have to be rejected for Greek as a hopeless oversimplification, even 
if it were not vitiated from the start by the confusion between a syntactic 
and a semantic criterion. The syntactic distinction between the absolute and 
predicative constructions is a problem for grammarians, and perhFtPS a difficult 
one. But I do not see that it is of any great importance for an understanding 
of the philosophic usage.15 Even more negligible is the question of the omission 
of the verb esti, which is sometimes regarded as a characteristic feature of 
the copulativeconstruction. (In fact the omissi on of the verb seems to be a 
purely stylistic feature, dictated by c�nsiderations of elegance or economy, 
and with no necessary relation to the syntax or meaning of the verb. The view 
that the predicative verb may be omitted, the existential not, is a pure myth. 
Democritus' famous statement in fr. 19, "by custom (nomos) there is sweet, by 
custom bitter, by custom hot, by custom color, but in reality there are atoms 
and the void,11 is the very model of an existential assertion, but the verb 
;;to be" is omitted in every clause, including the last). 
i�1at I have tried to do, then, is to clarify the semantic content and 

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but its being determinately so, as a man or a 4og or a triangle. 
The Forms of Plato and the essences of Aristotle are certainly not proposi­
tional in character, but they might thus be compared to open sentences, with 
an unfilled place for the subject. Even this comparison is far from satis­
factory (since neither Form nor essence is a linguistic entity), and it is 
put forward with all the diffidence it deserves. Hhat I mean to suggest 
is that Form and essence shobld be understood as proposition-like or proposi­
tion-generating. And even if this turned out to be false for the special 
doctrines of Form and essence, my main contention here would not be affected. 
For my contention is, first, that the terms on and onta are normally and 
idiomatically used for facts of a propositio'Ml structure; and, second, that 
just as to eon in Herodotus regularly constitutes the object of a verb of know­
ing or saying, so "beingn enters philosophy as the object of knowledge and true 
speech. Now it is only natural for the object of knowing to be conceived of 
after the pattern of propositions, for what can be known and truly stated is 
what is the case: a fact, situation, or relationship, not a particular thing 
or "object11 as such. The chief discrepancy between the Greek concept of 
Being and the modern notion of existence lies precisely here, for we normally 
assign existence not to facts or propositions or relations, but to discrete 
particulars: to creatures, persons, or things. 
Of course the Greek use of einai for localized existence tends to blur 
this distinction, since what is "SOme'Where is normally an individual entity, 
precisely the kind of thing t�which the modern notion of existence applies. 
When what i.s is used in this locative sense, it inevitably tends to be con­
ceived as thing-like rather than as fact- like. It is not so much that the 
Greeks lack our notion of existence, as that they lack our sense of its 
distinctness from essence or from the being-so of fact and predication. This 
is true not only for the metaphysicians, but also (as we saw) for a philosopher 
of common sense like ?rotagoras. 
To put the matter in a nutshell, the ontological vocabulary of the Greeks 
lad them to treat the existence of things and persons as a special case of the 
�estehen � Sachverhalte. It is remarkable that not only onta but every other 
Greek word for 11fact11 can also mean 11thing", and vice versa:-(Cf. chremata = 
pragmata in the fragment of Protagoras; ergon in the contrast with logos: 
"in fact" and "in word" gegonota as the perfect of onta, etc.) This failure 
on the part of the Greeks (at least before the Stoics) to make a systematic 
dictinction between fact and thing underlies the more superficial and inaccurate 
charge that they confused the nto be11 of predication with that of existence. 
It may be thought that the negl4ct of such a distinction constitutes a 
serious shortcoming in Greek philosophy of the classical period. But it was 
precisely this indiscriminate use of einai and� which permitted the metaphysi­
cians to state the problem of truth and reality in its most general form, to 
treat matters of fact and existence concerning the physical world as only a 
part of the problem (or as one of the possible answers), and to ask the 
ontological question itself: What is Being? that is, What is the object of 
true knowledge, the basis for true speech? If this is a question worth asking, 
then the ontological vocabulary of the Greeks, which permitted and encouraged 
them to ask it, must be regarded as a distinct philosophical asset. 
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fullest treatment is in s. Mansion, Le jugernent d'existence chez Aristote 
(1946), who notes that Aristotle assigns no definite sense to the existence 
of a thing considered apart from its essence (p. 243; cf. 260-265). 
16 Republic V 478A-E. Cf. Timaeus 28A-C2. 
